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analysis of the resistance to the
social constructionist paradigm
CHRISTOPHER DONOGHUE
Fordham University, 441 East Fordham Road, Bronx, New York, USA

ABSTRACT This article attempts to explain why the social constructionist paradigm has
failed to replace the medical model in American disability theory. The social movement led
by American disability activists attempted to reframe the definition of disability using a
minority group model based on the social constructionist paradigm. This paper argues that
the disability movement was unable to successfully advance the social constructionist
paradigm because the activists accepted the Americans With Disabilities Act (1990) despite
its ideological basis in the medical model of disability, and the social constructionist theory
does not adequately account for the importance of structural constraints to redefinition.
Introduction
Over the past century, the analytical frameworks that have been applied to disability
theory have undergone numerous alterations. Many of the paradigms once used to
define disability have not only been rejected, but in some cases, characterised as
indicative of narrow-mindedness or even prejudice. Oliver (1996) describes these
metamorphoses in the literature as evidence of a major transformation in disability
theory from a strictly medical definition of disability to a host of new paradigms that
have yet to fully develop. In the wake of these changes, Oliver predicts the
emergence of three types of inquiries into disability (the ontological, the epistemological and the experiential), each attempting to replace the traditional, medical
approach. One ontological method that would have seemed likely to take a strong
hold on the discipline is one that would define a disability not as a medical condition
residing in the individual, but as a social construction that may even be legitimating
a systematic form of inequality between the disabled and the non-disabled.
Yet, although this school of thought sometimes referred to as the minority group
model is rich in sociological tradition and has, indeed, been applied by many
theorists to disability studies (Gergen, 1985; Fine & Asch, 1988; Scotch, 1988;
Oliver, 1996; Brzuzy, 1997), it has not been successful in completely usurping the
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authority of the medical interpretation. Gordon and Rosenblum (2001) have contended that this is largely a shortcoming of American sociology, quite unlike the
British literature, which has placed greater emphasis on the view that a disability is
a social construction. This paper will argue that the social constructionist doctrine
on disability has failed to replace the medical model in America for two major
reasons. First, despite the momentum that was achieved in redefining disability
among academics and political activists, the landmark civil rights declaration, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), was won only through a costly compromise
that effectually led to an ideological surrender to the same medical model of
disability that it had attempted to replace. Secondly, although the social constructionist view of disability has been well articulated by many theorists, there has been
a general neglect of the importance of social structure in dictating the legitimate
definition of what it means to be disabled and how disability arises.
These two interrelated points will be used to explain a theory of why the social
constructionist definition of disability has not earned the same legitimacy that the
medical model definition has possessed throughout most of modern history. The
first argument which is essentially a critique of the ideological basis of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, seeks to explain why the American disability movement may
have accomplished an important legal victory, but lost in its broader effort to
transform the way in which most people conceptualise disability. The second
argument that the minority group paradigm did not adequately account for structural resistance to a redefinition of disability, examines some key difficulties that
were encountered by the disability activists who sought to develop a minority group
perspective on disability with a basis in the theory of social constructionism. Those
problems will be shown to center primarily upon the weakness of structural considerations not in the essential framework of the social constructionist theory, but
rather in its compatibility with a progressive social movement.
The Dominance of the Medical Model
Early twentieth century sociological discourse on health and illness generally did not
consider a disability as a defining state. Disabling conditions such as blindness,
‘mental retardation’, or paraplegia were generally lumped together with other
conditions that were not necessarily capable of causing disabilities. Those conditions
that were disabling were often referred to in crude terms that described physical
appearances or functional inabilities in a very simplistic manner. Terms such as
‘cripple’, ‘mongoloid’, ‘dwarf’, ‘peg-leg’ and ‘deformed’ were somewhat commonplace in the most academic of literature. Parsons (1951) took a functional approach
to health and illness. He treated an illness as a social role with precise expectations
and limitations. According to the theory, the sick are exempt from the obligations
and responsibilities that most members of society are expected to hold. Their state
is generally considered to be undesirable and, for that reason, they are expected to
seek professional assistance to bring relief to their situation. For several years,
Parson’s work was considered to be the authority on disability research, but his
functional approach to health and illness came under harsh criticism in the 1960s
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and 1970s, partly due to its overly reductive nature. More recently, Oliver (1996)
has claimed that his work does not consider the actual experiences of people with
disabilities and that it holds a bias to medical institutions.
Deviance theorists also began to emerge as major contributors to disability
theory. Lemert (1951) made a distinction between primary deviance and secondary
deviance, the latter of which may cause rejection of the deviant person by society as
a result of labelling and stereotyping. Goffman (1963) saw the abnormal nature of
people with disabilities as a source of stigma among the non-disabled. He believed
that stigma acted like a mark or a sign that the person was different and perhaps
harmful to the non-disabled. Friedson (1965) helped to popularise the notion that
people with disabilities are social deviants, by using the term in the context of
rehabilitation. His overall premise was that if it can be identified what it is about
some people that bring them into conflict with society’s morals or values, it will be
evident what needs to be changed in order for them to become accepted by the
non-disabled.
Despite the popularity that the deviance writers enjoyed, their theories were
firmly based on the notion that a person with a disability has been inflicted with a
personal tragedy (Oliver, 1996). In time, this characterisation of the disabled
became a matter of heated debate. In the 1970s and 1980s a new perspective on
disability began to materialise that considered external factors as the source of
disability, rather than individual impairments or deficiencies. At this time, the
disability movement was coming alive in America. People with disabilities had begun
to fight private institutions and the United States Government for their civil rights.
As a part of that process, they successfully transformed the traditional notions of
disability that treated it as a personal phenomenon, into a new wave of disability
theory that treated people with disabilities as members of a minority group that have
been discriminated against and prevented from becoming ‘normal’ members of
society. They pointed to stereotypes and prejudice as the culprit behind the construction of ‘handicaps’ and barriers in society that keep certain people from
becoming fully integrated and accepted. It is at this juncture that the issue of how
disability should be defined became a popular political issue, much as it had become
so among disability theorists. By 1990 the disability movement had achieved an
apparent victory with the signing of the Americans With Disabilities Act. The
legislation was soon touted as an overwhelming achievement of hard earned civil
rights for people with disabilities.
The Americans With Disabilities Act targeted the elimination of discrimination
against people with disabilities in four major areas: employment, state and local
government, products or services offered in the private sector, and telecommunications. On the subject of employment, questions such as whether or not a person has
a disability, or examinations that would explicitly test for the existence of a physical
impairment were to be eliminated. In addition, it required that employers make
‘reasonable accommodations’ in the workplace to people with disabilities, however,
this is true only to the extent that it does not cause ‘undue hardship’ to the
employer. This is a gray area of the title that has been the subject of some
controversy. The legislation further required that state and local governments ensure
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that none of their services are discriminatively offered to the non-disabled majority.
To this end, it mandated that state and local buses, trains, parks, programmes and
other services be made accessible to the disabled, as well as public buildings or
meeting places. It also required that local governments assess their accessibility
status on a regular basis and make the reports of their progress public. In the private
sector, businesses were deemed responsible for making reasonable accommodations
to ensure that all goods and services are available to people with or without
disabilities. Finally, the law held that all public telecommunications be made
accessible to people with disabilities. This was to include modifications such as
volume control devices on telephones, easier access to the buttons on public phones
and expanding the allotted space in phone booths.
The Americans With Disabilities Act is a finely crafted piece of legislation that
is not simply reflective of only one political ideology. Instead, it is a combination of
various political schools of thought wrapped up into one piece of legislation. Its
strongest asset is probably the bi-partisan angle that made lobbying somewhat easier
than might have been anticipated. It was appealing to liberals because it spoke to the
notions of freedom and liberty being available to all citizens, and because it called
for the government to take a role in ensuring that the disabled would be granted
equal rights. At the same time, however, it was not entirely unappealing to conservatives, who normally are opposed to such an expanded role of the government.
This was likely due to the fact that it did not include an Affirmative Action plan, or
any other such measure that would have required private businesses to expend too
many additional resources. Furthermore, there were exact lines in the legislation,
such as the requiring of only ‘reasonable accommodations’ and the prevention of
‘undue hardship’ to employers, that guaranteed that the private sector would not
need to sacrifice too much of their freedoms or devote an excess amount of resources
in order to be in compliance. To the extreme conservatives, and perhaps, the owners
of some private businesses in America, this still might have seemed to be a case of
the government overstepping its bounds. With the growing success of lobbyists for
people with disabilities gaining the support of many policymakers, however, it may
have seemed somewhat anti-American to refuse the idea that people with disabilities
should be granted such freedoms.
The passing of the law was, indeed, a historic achievement for disability activists
because it granted legitimacy to the civil rights of people with disabilities. Nevertheless, its approach to the issue of discrimination against people with disabilities is still
grounded in the medical paradigm. Silvers (1996) has contended the opposite, that
through the passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act, there has, indeed, been
an acknowledgment of society’s culpability in creating disability. Although it is true
that this revelation about the origin of disability has inspired some academics and
disability activists to reject the medical model of disability, a critical examination of
the legislation and its early years of enforcement may be argued to reveal that the
medical model has remained largely intact, despite the apparent victory for the
disability movement.
Instead of defining disability as a result of the barriers and ‘handicaps’ created
by society, the Americans With Disabilities Act reproduces the medical definition by
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defining it as an inability to perform a ‘normal’ life activity. By maintaining this
medical terminology, the idea that a disability is an individual problem is reinforced
by the legislation. In addition, it suggests that the physical limitations of the disabled
are what cause people to be discriminative. This stands in stark contrast to the
minority group position on disability, that discrimination is a product of the
stereotyped notions about people with disabilities. More explicitly, it implies
that employers discriminate against people with disabilities because they do not
believe that they can perform certain job functions, and not because they hold
negative stigmatised beliefs about what it would be like to work around people with
disabilities or how they think their customers will react to them (Hahn, 1994).
Minority group disability theorists adamantly insist that discrimination occurs as
the result of prejudice. Allowing the individualised notion of disability to prevail
allows policymakers and employers to conceptualise disability as a misfortune that
some people encounter, which legally only requires them to compensate by extending the reach of their services. It shows no recognition of the disability activists’
contention that civil rights are being breached due to negative ideas and images
that the non-disabled have about people with disabilities, nor does it show an
understanding of the institutionalised nature of discrimination against people with
disabilities.
Another troubling issue is found in the fact that only ‘reasonable accommodations’ are necessary and that employers should not have to suffer ‘undue hardship’.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the United States government’s
main institution for civil rights prosecution, has been delegated the authority to
handle lawsuits, seek settlements and provide the public with information on Title
I (Employment) of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Although the commission
has the responsibility to set forth interpretive guidelines for the enforcement of the
law, it effectually shares its power with the federal courts that make the ultimate
decisions on cases that proceed through litigation. Since the inception of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, the commission has made available a number of
publications that describe its position on acceptable practices and procedures under
the law. A recent guidance (EEOC, 1999) on the ‘reasonable accommodations’ and
‘undue hardship’ clauses, clears up some of the debate that has surrounded the
circumstances under which an employer can avoid providing an accommodation to
a person with a disability. In an apparent sign that people with disabilities will be
granted accommodations despite the cost to employers, the document states that the
test for ‘reasonableness’ does not allow for a consideration to be made for economic
difficulties that may be incurred by the employer. Yet in its clarification on ‘undue
hardship’, the guidance states that financial difficulties, major structural changes and
other employer concerns may indeed be used as a defense. The guidance does make
it clear, however, that it is the responsibility of employers to ensure accessibility. In
fact, the document expresses the commission’s staunch disagreement with the
decisions made by federal judges that do not go hard enough on businesses. Yet it
would seem that employers must make a decision to either follow the stricter
guidance set forth by the commission, or pursue a costly disagreement in the federal
courts (Janero & Ketay, 1999).
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As a point of comparison, perhaps we should consider how the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 would have been received by women and African Americans if it allowed
employers to discriminate in cases where it may cause them undue harm otherwise.
Many writers, in fact, have pointed out this glaring disparity between the civil rights
that were won for African Americans, and those that were achieved for people with
disabilities (Alston et al., 1994; Johnson & Baldwin, 1994). Clearly, African Americans and women were granted unconditional civil rights protection, whereas people
with disabilities seem to have only won civil rights to the extent that they are not
given at too great of an expense to their oppressors. From this perspective, the Civil
Rights Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act have much less in common than
it may appear at first glance. In order to understand why the Americans With
Disabilities Act was embraced by activists despite these limitations, an analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of the ideological basis of the minority group model is
necessary.
Limitations of the Minority Group Paradigm
In an effort to debunk the entrenched authority of the medical model, a social
constructionist paradigm has been adopted by many disability theorists and activists.
They have suggested that society normally creates a negative social identity for
people with disabilities (Gergen, 1985; Fine & Asch, 1988; Scotch, 1988; Brzuzy,
1997). Through the construction of this identity, which is typically characterised by
deviant or abnormal behaviour, the non-disabled majority is granted a legitimate
means to exclude and isolate people with disabilities. As removed members of
society, their contributions are often discredited and their successes are treated as
aberrations. Likewise, the expectations of people with disabilities are chronically
low, and there is an ever-present suggestion that their lives are not necessarily worth
living. This identity has been argued to derive from the medical model, which
defines a disability as a deficiency that restricts one’s ability to perform normal life
activities. By adopting the social constructionist viewpoint, theorists and activists
have contended that society has created disability by choosing not to remove
structural constraints that would enable more people to participate and gain access
to social resources. The social constructionist approach was an effective ideological
rejoinder to the established medical model. Yet the question of how to convince the
non-disabled majority that society has disabled certain individuals has not been
adequately resolved. The activists attempted to adopt the social constructionist
theory as a basis for a minority group model of disability. They would use this model
to support a plea for action to people with disabilities as a mechanism to overcome
the oppression being inflicted upon them by the non-disabled majority.
While it is clear that such a transformation of the definition of disability among
academics and disability activists has clearly taken hold, the disability movement
appears to have achieved only limited success in changing the views of the
non-disabled majority. By accepting the reward of civil rights protection without
insisting that the medical model be publicly dismantled, the hopes of the disability
activists to change the views of the broader public may have been sacrificed. The
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willingness to make this concession may have stemmed from the belief among
social constructionist theorists that society will change its perception of disability if
it is merely demonstrated that the prior notion has been made unjustly. From a
structural point of view, it would seem to take much more to convince a dominant
group in society that it needs to redistribute power and access to its treasured
resources. The more desirable arrangement to the non-disabled majority is one
that maintains the superiority of people with ‘normal’ abilities. As a result, the
disabled are typically described as dysfunctional and are often perceived to be
incapable of understanding the world in the same way that ‘normal’ people do.
Although social constructionists argue that such judgements regarding how people
should be able to think or act are subjective notions that stem from dominant social
ideologies, they may be said to underestimate the extent to which those ideologies
are created and legitimated by the non-disabled majority because they best serve
their interests.
Similar conclusions may be drawn from the social constructionist view on the
formation of the disability identity. Berger and Luckmann (1966) refer to identity as
a social phenomenon created by the theoretical interaction between language, the
social structure and individual consciousness. The melding of these social dynamics
creates a dialect of communication for reference to a type of person. That dialect,
in turn, serves to reinforce the ideas and images present in its creation, onto the
actual person and further perpetuate its reality. Berger and Luckmann do not,
however, see it as a pre-determined outcome, i.e. their inclusion of the role of
individual consciousness. Instead, they see identity maintaining a constant state of
flux, which can be affected by the individual as well as external factors. While it may
be said that at its core the dominant perception of identity consists of a discourse
between language and the social structure, the social constructionist theory maintains the optimistic viewpoint that the individual is capable of choosing to resist that
image or take on the ascribed role. It is evident that the disability activists embraced
this notion in their very public struggle for civil rights that was so noted for its
leaders who refused to accept the standard role of the disabled. Despite the apparent
value that this method had in persuading American policymakers, it may be said to
have perpetuated the notion that people with disabilities must take it upon themselves to defy the expectations of the non-disabled. Due to this belief, the minority
group model theorists may have compromised their position that society has been
exclusively to blame for the unequal position of people with disabilities. To the
contrary, the absence of such an uprising of people with disabilities in the past could
just have easily been blamed for the unequal status of the disabled. This is an
important element of the social constructionist theory that seems to have weakened
the bargaining power of the disability activists and also led to a costly similarity to
the medical model, in the view that an individual alone may have the capability to
overcome disadvantage. Had the disability activists focused more on their core
position that language and the social structure form a dialect that is largely reflective
of the broader society’s values, morals and interests, they may have considered more
radical measures that would have made them reluctant to accept civil rights at the
expense of a compromise on the definition of disability.
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Another problematic aspect of the minority group paradigm is its assertion that
people with disabilities actually redefined themselves, and that the movement really
stemmed from the ‘community’ of people with disabilities. Scotch (1989) cites the
wide geographical distribution of people with disabilities across the country; the lack
of shared characteristics among the activists (aside from their disabilities); and the
differences between the accommodations they require specific to their disabilities; all
of which likely contributed to a less than uniform effort among disabled individuals
seeking a new public perception. Zola (1982) has further pointed out that many
people with disabilities are isolated from the outside world, making it difficult for
them to participate in such a movement. This inevitably raises the question of
whether the social constructionist paradigm allows for the redefinition of a group of
people through the actions of a few. This may be a point of inconsistency between
the minority group model and the social constructionist theory. Clearly, the minority
group approach must hold that a social movement is capable of achieving group
redefinition, but it is not quite clear that the traditional view of social constructionism would consider that new definition to be equal among the competing identities
that derive from language and the social structure.
Finally, the debate between the medical model and the minority group model
is essentially a struggle for legitimacy. The long standing, unequal position of the
disabled has been adequately shown by the social constuctionists to rest upon the
hegemony of the medical model. In order to alleviate that inequality, a transformation of the ideological basis of legitimacy needs to take place. Consider the
traditional social constructionist view on legitimation:
Legitimation produces new meanings that serve to integrate the meanings
already attached to disparate institutional processes. The function of legitimation is to make objectively available and subjectively plausible the
‘first-order’ objectivations that have been institutionalized … Legitimation
‘explains’ the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings. (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, pp. 92, 93)
The ‘meanings already attached’ are those negative images that come with the label
of disability. Perpetuated by the media, culture and popular literature, these meanings are the sources of misconceptions and stigmatisation. The ‘new meanings’
adapt the nature of these ideas and crystallise the common ideology of disability.
This ideology is then called upon in common conversation and behaviour in society,
strengthening the notion and increasing its acceptance. It is then not only commonly
accepted, but also entirely plausible in the minds of those that incorporate it. At the
point in which the notion has become fully legitimated, it becomes a strong
ideological force that cannot be easily transformed. The reign of the medical model
definition of disability has been predicated on its ownership of this legitimacy. As the
social constructionist theory predicts, language and the social structure operate to
define identify and meaning. This would lead to the conclusion, therefore, that the
social constructionist paradigm will only gain wider acceptance if it is able to
transform the ideological basis of legitimacy on the definition of disability.

Medical Defination of Disability

207

Conclusion
The medical model of disability has been the legitimate conceptual paradigm for
understanding disability throughout the history of modernity in America. The
attempt to replace it with a definition of disability based on a social constructionist
interpretation known as the minority group model, does not appear to have been
completely successful. Despite the passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act of
1990, it remains unclear whether the movement has earned legal civil rights
protection alone, or if it has accomplished an ideological transformation of the
established disability identity. This paper has argued the position that the Americans
With Disabilities Act granted legitimacy only to the claim that people with disabilities deserve civil rights protection. Due to its failure to reject the medical model
definition of disability, it has essentially provided a benefit to people with disabilities
under the condition that they continue to be defined as abnormal members of
society. This is illustrated by the criteria that the Americans With Disabilities Act
sets to define people with disabilities. According to the legislation, the disabled are
those who are incapable of performing normal life activities. This definition is
perfectly consistent with the medical model, which has been said to individualise the
nature of disability. In addition, the Americans With Disabilities Act fails to provide
unqualified civil rights protection to people with disabilities. This is in notable
contrast with prior civil rights acts that granted such freedoms for other disadvantaged members of society. It was further argued that this unequal compromise was
struck between the disability activists and policymakers, due to a number of different
weaknesses in the ideological basis of the minority group model. Key among its
deficiencies is the potentially idealistic notion that the non-disabled majority will not
resist a redefinition of disability at the cost of its own power and dominance.
Inconsistencies between the minority group paradigm and the social constructionist
theory on the role of the individual, were also cited as possible reasons why the
disability activists may have settled for a qualified victory.
In conclusion, it would appear as though the work of the disability movement
has not yet been completed. In order to achieve the transformation of the disability
identity from one that invokes notions of personal tragedy to one that reflects a
history of prejudice and oppression, a visible shift in the ideological basis of the
legitimate definition of disability must be achieved. While recent history may suggest
that this transition cannot be accomplished due to the strength of the resistance to
such a change, a future social movement may be capable of achieving success. The
findings of this analysis would suggest that such a movement would need to develop
a strategy that incorporates a viable response to structural resistance. It would
further need to define success only upon validation of a new and legitimate
definition of disability. Accepting a partial victory may be tantamount to a sacrifice
that would undermine its mission.
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